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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission responded to
concerns over high executive compensation levels and compensationdriven conflicts of interest and promulgated new regulations requiring
more disclosure about executive compensation. 1 Also, recent federal
and stock exchange laws and regulations emphasize the independent
monitoring board as a mechanism to curtail accounting and financial
fraud. Moreover, post-Enron reforms may have led to an increase in the
number of board positions available and greater opportunities for women
and people of color to serve on public company boards. 2 Boards have
increased diversity in an attempt to meet the product and service needs
of an increasingly diverse population and thereby improve corporate
bottom lines. Nonetheless, executive compensation remains high,
accounting fraud and mismanagement persists, and board diversity is
lacking.
This Article seeks to use social science research to better
understand why these and other corporate governance problems persist.
One reason may be that boards are biased as to how they respond to
these issues. Social science research on risk perception informs us that
individuals’ “preferences among different types of risk taking (or
avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or
ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different
patterns of social relations.” 3 Cultural theorists have identified four

1. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Executive Compensation and Related Party
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229,
239, 240, 245, 249, and 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf.
2. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, THE BOTTOM LINE ON BOARD DIVERSITY: A COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS RATIONALES FOR DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS, 1-2 (2005).
3. Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception; Who Fears What and Why?,
119 DAEDALUS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 43, 43 (1990). See also Karl
Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews
and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 65 (1991) (describing an empirical
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competing worldviews: communitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and
egalitarian. 4 The communitarian and individualistic worldviews are at
opposite ends of a spectrum measuring the degree to which an
individual’s self-identity and preferred social relations derive from
membership in a group. 5 For example, communitarians prefer to make
decisions by consensus and value solidarity, 6 while individualists prefer
autonomy and self-regulation, and value market relationships and the
freedom to bid and bargain for themselves. 7 The egalitarian and
hierarchical worldviews are at opposite ends of a scale measuring the
degree to which an individual’s self-identity and preferred social
relations derive from social differentiation. 8 Egalitarians “value strong
equality of outcome in the sense of diminishing distinctions among
people such as wealth, race, gender, authority, etc.” 9 By contrast, people
who subscribe to a hierarchical worldview prefer “superior/subordinate”
forms of social relations and role differentiation based on the distinctions
(such as wealth and authority) disfavored by egalitarians. 10
A recent empirical study conducted by the Cultural Cognition
Project at Yale University suggests that one type of cognitive bias—a
misperception of the risks inherent in certain types of socially charged
activities—may derive from a phenomenon termed “cultural-identityprotective cognition (“CIP”).” 11 Socially charged activities are those
that are controversial and that carry social meaning. Social meaning
refers to an activity’s power to shape how one person perceives others
who are engaged in that activity. 12 The theory of CIP cognition

research project to test and confirm the theory that “individuals choose what to fear (and how much
to fear it) in order to support their way of life”).
4. See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 62-64
(Routledge, 2d ed. 2003) (explaining in Douglas’ system of classification, a communitarian
worldview corresponds to a high group social dimension, an individualistic worldview to a low
group dimension, a hierarchical worldview to a high grid dimension, and an egalitarian worldview
to a low grid dimension). See also Steven Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL
THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S. Krimsky & D. Goldin eds., 1992).
5. See DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 63. See also Rayner, supra note 4, at 87.
6. Steven Rayner, Management of Radiation Hazards in Hospitals: Plural Rationalities in a
Single Institution, 16 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 577, 581 (1986). See also Rayner, supra note 4, at 90.
7. Dake, supra note 3, at 66.
8. See DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 62.
9. Dake, supra note 3, at 67.
10. Id. at 66-67.
11. Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White
Male Effect in Risk Perception, J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995634.
12. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962520
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proposes that an individual’s over or under emphasis of the risks
associated with socially charged activities, such as gun ownership,
abortions, and environmental pollution, may be due to the tendency for
individuals to be biased in favor of or against activities in a manner that
Under this view, status is not only
furthers social status. 13
socioeconomic status. Status refers to the individual’s self-identity and
social role(s) as reflected by that individual’s preferred worldview. 14
Status is dependent on cultural norms and is threatened by those holding
opposing norms. 15 In other words, an individual’s risk insensitivity (or
oversensitivity) is tied to an individual’s worldview; “insensitivity to
risk” may be a “defensive response to a form of cultural identity
threat.” 16
The Yale research study attempted to explain the “white male
effect”—a “well documented pattern” showing that certain white men
fear various risks less than women and minorities. 17 Research on risk
perception has demonstrated that a group of affluent, highly educated
white males, who also tend to hold very hierarchical and individualistic
norms, tend to misperceive (more so than white females and people of
color) the risks of certain activities in a manner that is consistent with
their worldviews. 18 In fact, the research indicates that the risk
perceptions of these males tends to be highly skewed in favor of
activities that may be seen as advancing their status in society, and
highly skewed against activities that tend to threaten their social status. 19
Evidence from the Yale study suggests that gender and race “influenced
risk perception only in conjunction with distinctive worldviews that
themselves feature either gender or race differentiation or both in social
roles involving putatively dangerous activities.” 20 Moreover, the
variance among risk perceptions and the misperception of risks may
derive more from variance among social norms, than from race, sex,

(listing, as an example, that listening to rap music may be one example of a socially charged
activity. Rap music is the subject of some debate, and it calls to mind preconceived notions of rap
artists and the kinds of activities in which rap artists engage).
13. Id. at 3.
14. See discussion infra Section III.C.1 (explaining the “white male” effect).
15. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
16. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 3. It also may be the case that oversensitivity to risk
derives from perceived threats to one’s cultural identity.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 30-32.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3.
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political affiliation, or any other personal characteristic. 21
The Yale research provides evidence of the general population’s
CIP risk assessment bias related to gun control, environmental
protection, and abortion availability policies—issues that have generated
a great deal of political controversy. 22 This Article proposes that CIP
risk assessment may systematically bias director decision-making. The
basic premise is that directors of publicly traded U.S. corporations are
not immune from the effects of bias driven by CIP cognition. In
addition, this Article is grounded in the notion that directors may
predominantly subscribe to hierarchical worldviews. A majority of the
directors of large, publicly-held corporations are white males who are
affluent and highly educated, and who hold executive positions or are
retired from executive positions. 23 Demonstrated ability to lead in a
hierarchical organizational structure, to act quickly and decisively, and
to commit to a decision are some of the attributes of individuals who
achieve top management positions. 24 These behavioral characteristics
are consistent with hierarchical and individualistic norms.
Moreover, this Article argues that directors’ decision-making may
involve risk-taking with respect to matters that may carry a social
charge. For example, director monitoring of conflict of interest
transactions, decisions regarding executive and director compensation,
and recommendations to pursue or, more frequently, to terminate
shareholder derivative litigation are controversial corporate governance
issues. Generally, the public has a negative perception of directors who
award and receive high compensation packages, or who sit on boards of
21. Id.
22. Id. at 10-12. See also discussion infra Section III.C.2.
23. A recent study of Fortune 1000 companies demonstrated that women were represented on
82% of corporate boards; 76% of Fortune 1000 boards included at least one ethnic minority. See
Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color,
and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2005).
The number of companies with ethnic and gender diversity generally has increased over the last ten
years. See Business for Social Responsibility, Issue Brief: Board Diversity Recent Developments,
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.cfm?DocumentID=443 (last visited November
7, 2007). The number of women and minorities as a percentage of the total number of board seats
remains small. For example, as of September 30, 2004, 1,195 board seats existed on Fortune 100
companies, 16.9% of those were held by women, 14.9% were held by minorities. THE ALLIANCE
FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, WOMEN & MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 100 BOARDS 4 (2005),
http://www.catalystwomen.org/files/full/ABD%20report.pdf.
Moreover, individuals held an
average of 1.2 board seats. Id. at 5. African-American directors held an average of 1.5 board seats.
While only one corporation had no women on its board, it was not uncommon to find a board with
no minorities, particularly no Asian-Americans or Hispanic Americans. Id. at 6.
24. See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 697-701 (2005).
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corporations that reveal long-standing accounting fraud.
Further, the article presents two strategies to neutralize the impact
of CIP risk assessment on corporate decision-making. One possible
strategy may be that courts give greater scrutiny to directors’ decisions
that particularly may be prone to risk assessment bias. Generally, courts
assume that directors’ decisions may be biased due to conflicts of
interest arising from financial factors and familial relationships. Courts
may give greater scrutiny to directors’ decisions if the board is operating
under a conflict of interest at the time of the transaction, or may give
more deference to decisions made by a board (or a board committee)
free from conflict. However, courts also assume that other incentives,
such as a need to protect one’s cultural identity, will not influence
directors’ decisions (at least not in any way that regulation needs to
address). Courts may have underestimated the extent to which such
cognitive bias influences director behavior. The Yale study provides
evidence that judges may need to take into account directors’ worldview
biases when reviewing directors’ decisions.
Moreover, courts take as a given that boards engage in risk-benefit
analysis when making decisions, and, absent a conflict of interest, courts
only look to whether the board was properly informed about the risks
and benefits. However, the Yale study’s results suggest that courts
should discount board risk evaluation due to “cognitive biases and
errors,” at least in some circumstances that currently do not receive close
judicial review. 25 In these circumstances, courts should engage in some
hindsight evaluation of corporate actions because there is a high
probability that the board’s risk evaluation expresses an inappropriate,
extreme individualistic and hierarchical norm that does not comport with
the best interests of the shareholders and other corporate constituencies.
If CIP risk assessment affects board behavior, then the Yale study’s
results suggest that boards may need to take steps to ensure diversity in
worldviews, as well as gender and race diversity, on corporate boards.
The second strategy may be to encourage directors to ensure that the
various worldviews are well represented on corporate boards. This may
be accomplished in part by educating directors about differing
worldviews and about the costs and benefits of diversity in worldviews
on corporate boards. Director education at least may raise awareness of
bias to a conscious level. As a result, boards may seek board candidates
with diverse worldviews. Also, boards may assign a director (or
committee) the task of “chief naysayer”—someone whose questions
25. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 35.
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would arise from worldviews not represented by the majority of the
board. 26
Further, the Article suggests that although CIP cognition affects all
directors, non-management directors may be better situated (after
education) than management directors to provide a voice on the board to
counteract the effects of CIP cognition. 27 Non-management directors
generally are not involved in day-to-day corporate operations. Also,
non-management directors often are free from financial ties to the
corporation, other than receiving director compensation. It may be that
many types of bias influence director behavior; non-management
directors may have less baggage to address.
Moreover, nonmanagement directors are supposed to behave according to legal and
business norms that require non-management directors to exercise
unbiased oversight. However, it is conceivable that a director without
financial or familial ties to the corporation or its executives may be more
likely to become aware of bias and take steps to neutralize its effects.
A longstanding debate exists about the non-management director’s
proper role—protector of the shareholders or protector of other
constituencies, including employees and others, sometimes at the
expense of the shareholders. 28 Empirical literature on this issue has

26. Paredes, supra note 24, at 740-41.
27. Courts and commentators use different terms to describe non-management directors,
including “independent,” “disinterested,” “nonexecutive,” and “outside,” and use different terms to
describe the ability of non-management directors to render unbiased judgments. In this Article, I
will borrow a term from a recent article by Donald C. Clarke that simply describes that the directors
are not managers of the firm, and implies as little as possible about the directors’ ability to exercise
unbiased judgment, “non-management directors.” See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the
Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 83-84 (2007). Management directors hold executive
positions within the corporation, such as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. Nonmanagement directors do not hold executive positions within the corporation. Non-management
directors are often senior executives at other corporations, public sector employees who are
influential in political circles or in some other way influential in the corporation’s business, wellregarded academics, or former or current counsel to the corporation. Id. at 79.
28. Much of this debate originally was descriptive as well as normative. Adolf A. Berle and
Gardiner C. Means wrote their seminal piece on the role of directors and the agency cost problem in
corporate governance at the end of a transformative period in American business. ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1933) (1934). Berle and Means argued that shareholders were
becoming more numerous and more dispersed and that managers often did not have equity positions
in the corporation. Id. at 47, 119-21. They posited that these facts would give rise to agency cost
problems. Id. at 121-25. In other words, corporate managers no longer had the incentive to
maximize value as owners, because managers generally were not owners. Instead, managers had
incentives to minimize the amount of work they had to do and maximize the salary they would
receive. Further, shareholders were too dispersed to take collective action easily, generally too
uninterested to put out the effort to take action, and willing to let other shareholders bear the burden
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sought to determine whether having a majority of non-management
directors improves corporate financial performance. This literature also
seeks to provide a basis for making policy decisions about the need for,
and functions of, non-management directors. 29 The studies’ results are
mixed. 30 Some researchers suggest that non-management directors’
presence on corporate boards does little to improve corporate
performance, while other evidence shows some benefit gained when
independent directors perform certain functions on board committees. 31
This Article does not recommend that non-management directors
are the solution to the problem of CIP risk assessment on corporate
boards. Also, it does not attempt to take a position about the proper role
for non-management directors. This Article suggests that, indeed, under
our current corporate governance system, CIP risk assessment bias may
be a difficult problem to solve. There may be very few directors who
are capable of exercising unbiased judgment in any directorial role. 32
To my knowledge, there is no empirical study to determine whether nonmanagement directors exercise more or less biased risk assessment than
management directors. Risk perception studies of directors’ behavior
might provide answers.
Section II explores directors’ various roles and functions.
Empirical studies of director behavior and how they perceive their roles
and functions are few and far between. Part A describes nonmanagement directors’ roles and functions as stated in best practices of
corporate governance industry groups and institutional investor
literature. Part B similarly discusses the roles and functions of the
management director. Part C discusses state and federal review of
directors’ actions. Section III discusses the empirical evidence. Part A
discusses some of the ways that risk assessment plays a role in corporate

of keeping management in check. Id. The Berle and Means piece became the keystone for the
shareholder primacy debate. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 85 n.41. The debate has transformed
from one mostly that seeks to describe the role of the director in corporate governance, to one that
mostly seeks to state normatively and prescriptively what the directors’ role should be. See id. at 79
n.30, 84-85 (citing literature on the role of the board of directors in corporate governance, and the
shareholder versus stakeholder primacy debate).
29. See generally Dennis Wright Michaud & Kate A. Margaram, Recent Technical Papers on
Corporate Governance 2 (Brown U. Corp. Governance Program, Working Paper, 2006), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=895520.
30. See id. See also Clarke, supra note 27, at 75 (citing recent literature).
31. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 27, at 75-76; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of
Independence 1, 4 (U. Ga. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513.
32. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race,
Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 1079-86 (2005).
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law and how emotions and cognitive bias impact risk assessment. Part B
introduces theoretical and empirical research on how an individual’s
demographic characteristics and cultural norms impact risk assessment.
In addition, Part B discusses the Yale study on cultural bias and the
white male effect. This part suggests that cognitive bias is inherent on
publicly traded boards and effects board perception of risk-taking. 33
Section IV discusses what the Yale study may add to our understanding
of cognitive bias on corporate boards. It further develops the idea that
there is no such person as an unbiased director, and that bias
systematically influences board decision-making. Section IV discusses
possibilities for legal rule reform and director education as ways to
neutralize or mitigate the effects of CIP risk assessment bias. Each
subpart of Part A discusses potential strategies to neutralize the effects
of CIP risk assessment bias. Part B discusses objections to the strategies
offered in Part A and offers counterarguments to those objections.
Section IV’s mitigation strategies suggest a framework for further
studies of director behavior. Possible theoretical and empirical studies
are described in Section V. As one legal scholar recently warned,
“caution is warranted before corporate governance is revamped radically
to address CEO overconfidence or other aspects of managerial
psychology.” 34 The Conclusion stresses that making directors more
aware of worldview bias likely requires more than one legal, cultural or
cognitive change. Further study may shed light on the types of change
warranted.
II. THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
PUBLICLY HELD UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS
In the United States, state law primarily defines the role of the
board of directors with respect to governing the corporation,
relationships with the shareholders and other corporate constituencies,
and other matters of corporate governance. 35 State law does not list
detailed responsibilities and functions of the board of directors; instead
state corporations statutes broadly define director responsibilities and
functions. 36 Specifically, matters such as appointment of the chief
33. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
34. Paredes, supra note 24, at 681.
35. See id. at 147.
36. See, e.g. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised
by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of
the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight of its board
of directors. . . .”); 8 DEL. C. § 141(a) (West 2007) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
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officers responsible for day-to-day corporate operations; managing the
director election process; setting salaries and compensation of directors
and officers; distributing corporate assets; formulating corporate
strategy; recommending major corporate business action to shareholders;
disseminating information about the company’s finances and other
important business matters; ensuring adequate information flows from
the top down and the bottom up; hiring and overseeing auditors; and
managing corporate litigation are all within the ultimate authority of the
board under state statutes and state case law. 37
Recently, and to a greater extent than in the past, federal law also
impacts corporate governance. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOA”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
self-regulatory rules promulgated thereunder, prescribe the
composition 38 and responsibilities 39 of a publicly-traded corporation’s
audit committee, and the composition 40 and responsibilities 41 of the
corporation’s compensation committee. 42

organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. . .
.”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 2007).
The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the direction of the board. The board may delegate the
management of the day-to-day operation of the business of the corporation to a
management company or other person provided that the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised under the
ultimate direction of the board.
Id.
37. See, e.g., 8 DEL. C. § 121(a) (West 2007).
In addition to the powers enumerated in Section 122 of this title, every corporation [and]
its . . . directors . . . shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges granted
by this chapter or by any other law or by its certificate of incorporation, together with
any powers incidental thereto. . . .
Id. Section 122 states that:
[e]very corporation created under this chapter shall have power to: . . . (2) sue and be
sued . . . in its corporate name; . . . (5) appoint such officers and agents as the business of
the corporation requires and . . . pay . . . them suitable compensation.
8 DEL. C. § 122 (West 2007). Section 141(a) empowers directors to manage or to direct the
management of the corporation. Section 170(a) authorizes directors to declare dividends. Section
213(a) empowers directors to fix the record date to determine stockholders entitled to vote at a
meeting of stockholders. Section 251(b) requires that directors adopt a resolution “approving an
agreement of merger” prior to submitting the agreement to the stockholders. See 8 DEL. C. §§ 141,
170, 213, 251 (West 2007).
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3) (West Supp. 2002))
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(3)).
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(2) (West Supp. 2002))
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(2)).
40. See
NYSE,
Inc.,
Listed
Company
Manual
§
303A.05(a)
(2004),
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf.
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Board members of publicly traded corporations are either employed
by the corporation as corporate officers and executives or are not
employed by the corporation in a management function. 43 This Article
will use the term “management directors” to describe directors who are
employed as corporate officers and executives; it will borrow the term
“non-management directors” to describe directors who do not hold
corporate management positions. 44 The distinction is important for a
number of reasons. First, state and federal law envision different roles
for management directors versus non-management directors. 45 Second,
empirical studies investigate whether there is a relationship between
disinterested and independent directors on corporate boards—as a
practical matter these are usually non-management directors—and
corporate performance. 46 Third, to the extent that cognitive bias
deriving from management positions or conflicts of interest—such as
chief executive overconfidence and structural bias—influence director
decision-making, directors without such bias may be better situated to
exert an unbiased influence on board decision-making processes.
A.

What Do Non-management Directors Do and What Roles and
Functions Does U.S. Federal and State Law Envision for Nonmanagement Directors?
Non-management directors are in the best position to describe what

41. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(b)(i) (2004),
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf.
42. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the
Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 482, 504-06 (2006) (describing corporate
directors’ and officers’ fiduciary standards of care after SOA).
43. Indeed, under SOA a corporation must have non-management directors on the board to
fulfill the requirements of SOA § 301 and the stock exchange listing rules specified in supra notes
40-41. According to a recent survey, virtually all publicly traded corporation boards have a
majority of non-management directors.
44. The term non-management director simply describes a director who currently is not part
of the corporation’s management team. I use the term non-management director throughout this
Article because it implies nothing about whether the director is independent or disinterested as those
terms are used for purposes of compliance with state or federal law requirements. The legal
requirements imposed by state and federal law may limit what a non-management director may do
and still be in compliance with state or federal law. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 27, at 78-80.
45. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also LAWRENCE D. BROWN & MARCUS L.
CAYLOR, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY: THE
CORRELATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 2-4 (2004),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/PatrickMcGurn.pdf (independent board of directors, nominating committees, and compensation
committees linked to improved firm performance).
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they do, how they perceive their roles and functions, the content of their
communications between other non-management directors and
management directors, and whether or not they explicitly recognize the
potential that their decision-making will be affected by cognitive bias.
However, in the absence of narrative evidence from non-management
directors, corporate industry groups, institutional investors and their
groups, anecdotal evidence from comments to proposed federal and
stock exchange regulations dealing with the issue of independence, news
reports in connection with major corporate transactions and
announcements, and after-the-fact investigations into allegations of
board-level wrongdoing are probably the best sources of information on
the roles and functions of non-management directors. 47
For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System’s (“CalPERS”) view of the role of the non-management director
contemplates that the non-management director is an “independent
director”—that is, one whose relationships with the company or its
management would not foreclose the director from exercising unbiased
judgment. 48 “Independence is the cornerstone of accountability” 49 and,

47. The body of empirical legal, economic, and management scholarship on independent
directors is growing. See, e.g., Barbara R. Bergmann, Needed: A New Empiricism, 4 THE
ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 1-4 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2/art2. This
growth stems from a renewed emphasis on corporate governance and accountability combined with
calls from Congress, federal agencies, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
stock exchange regulatory organizations for more independence on corporate boards. Id.
48. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System is an organization that provides and
administers health and retirement benefits to California’s public employees and employers. See
CalPERS Online, About CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/home.xml (last
visited August 2, 2007). CalPERS defines an “independent director” as a director who:
[H]as not been employed by the Company in an executive capacity within the last five
years;
[I]s not, and is not affiliated with a company that is, an adviser or consultant to the
Company or a member of the Company’s senior management;
[I]s not affiliated with a significant customer or supplier of the Company;
[H]as no personal services contract(s) with the Company, or a member of the
Company’s senior management;
[I]s not affiliated with a not-for-profit entity that receives significant contributions from
the Company;
[W]ithin the last five years, has not had any business relationship with the Company
(other than service as a director) for which the Company has been required to make
disclosure under Regulation S-K of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
[I]s not employed by a public company at which an executive officer of the Company
serves as a director; has not had any of the relationships described above with any
affiliate of the Company;
[A]nd is not a member of the immediate family of any person described above.
THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORE PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (1998), http://web.archive.org/web/20000918044843/www.calpers-
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in CalPERS’ view, accountability leads to good corporate governance.
Moreover, CalPERS states that independence means the director has no
“personal, financial or professional” conflicts of interest that would
preclude the director from acting in the shareholder’s best interests. 50
In CalPERS’ view, the non-management director is as influential as
executive management, both in monitoring corporate activities and in
creating strategic change. CalPERS recognizes that its vision may not
be the best fit for all corporations but, significantly, stresses that the
leadership of the board must embrace director independence. 51 Thus, if
the lead board position—Chairman of the Board—also is held by the
lead executive position—Chief Executive Officer—then CalPERS
recommends that the independent directors appoint a lead independent
director to coordinate the activities of the independent directors. 52
Specifically, the lead independent director would facilitate the flow of
information to and among the non-management directors and between
the non-management directors and the board’s executive members,
influence who would serve as directors on board committees and as
committee chairs, and would facilitate the board’s decision-making
process, among other responsibilities. 53
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf [hereinafter CORE
PRINCIPLES].
49. CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 48, at 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 14. The lead independent director’s duties would include:
[A]dvise the Chair as to an appropriate schedule of Board meetings, seeking to ensure
that the independent directors can perform their duties responsibly while not interfering
with the flow of Company operations;
[P]rovide the Chair with input as to the preparation of the agendas for the Board and
Committee meetings;
[A]dvise the Chair as to the quality, quantity and timeliness of the flow of information
from Company management that is necessary for the independent directors to
effectively and responsibly perform their duties; although Company management is
responsible for the preparation of materials for the Board, the Lead Independent
Director may specifically request the inclusion of certain material;
[R]ecommend to the Chair the retention of consultants who report directly to the Board;
[I]nterview, along with the chair of the [nominating committee], all Board candidates,
and make recommendations to the [nominating committee] and the Board;
[A]ssist the Board and Company officers in assuring compliance with and
implementation of the Company’s [Governance Guidelines]; principally responsible for
recommending revisions to the [Governance Guidelines];
[C]oordinate, develop the agenda for and moderate executive sessions of the Board’s
independent directors; act as principal liaison between the independent directors and the
Chair on sensitive issues;
[E]valuate, along with the members of the [compensation committee/full board], the
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According to the Business Roundtable (“BRT”), an association of
chief executive officers and “an authoritative voice on matters affecting
American business corporations,” 54 “making decisions regarding the
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical
CEO is the single most important function of the board.” 55 In addition
to selecting and overseeing the CEO and other corporate management
who oversee the day-to-day operations of the corporation, the board’s
oversight responsibilities include:
[P]lanning for management development and succession;
understanding, reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the
corporation’s strategic plans; understanding and approving annual
operating plans and budgets; focusing on the integrity and clarity of the
corporation’s financial statements and financial reporting; advising
management on significant issues facing the corporation; reviewing
and approving significant corporate actions; reviewing management’s
plans for business resiliency; nominating directors and committee
members and overseeing effective corporate governance; and
56
overseeing legal and ethical compliance.

The directors delegate responsibility for managing the corporation’s
affairs to the chief senior executive. 57 However, the directors should
“exercise vigorous and diligent oversight of a corporation’s affairs.” 58
Similar to CalPERS, the BRT envisions that independent directors
play a significant role, both in monitoring corporate affairs and in
approving specific transactions. 59 According to the BRT, a board
“should have a substantial degree of independence from management”
when fulfilling its oversight role. 60 According to the BRT’s governance
principles, “[p]roviding objective, independent judgment is at the core of
the board’s oversight function and the board’s composition should
reflect this principle.” 61

CEO’s performance; meet with the CEO to discuss the Board’s evaluation; and
[R]ecommend to the Chair the membership of the various Board Committees, as well as
selection of the Committee chairs in addition to the general duties of board members.
Id. at 13-14.
54. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, 1 (2005),
http://64.203.97.43/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8-10.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14.
61. Id.
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The BRT’s definition of independence appears narrower than the
CalPERS definition, in that the BRT’s definition excludes “business,
employment, charitable or personal” relationships with the company or
its management that in fact or appearance would render the director
unable to exercise “independent judgment.” 62 On the other hand, the
CalPERS definition forecloses all relationships that might bias an
independent director’s judgment. However, the board as a whole
determines whether a director is or is not independent, taking into
account “the federal securities laws, securities market listing standards,
and the views of institutional investors and other relevant groups.” 63
Furthermore, the BRT recommends that the board have
independent leadership, either by separating the roles of CEO and
chairperson of the board, by creating and filling a lead director position
who plays a key role in evaluating the CEO’s performance (among other
roles), or by appointing a non-management director to preside over
executive sessions of non-management directors. 64
Federal and state laws and regulations embody various formulations
of independence and envisage different roles and functions for nonmanagement directors. 65 State statutes define independence with respect
to whether the director has an interest in a particular transaction. 66 For
example, non-management directors may review conflict of interest
transactions and may determine if those transactions comply with a
director’s fiduciary duties at the state level. In this scenario, nonmanagement directors function as “a substitute for external regulation”
primarily at the state level and possibly as a gatekeeper to protect
shareholders from director “overreaching.” 67
Federal law and related regulations appear to envision that nonmanagement directors primarily protect shareholders from
management’s abuse of power and misuse of assets. SOA sets standards
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Clarke, supra note 27, at 79-84.
66. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.64; 8 DEL. C. § 144(a)(1) (West 2007). For
a more detailed discussion of state law with respect to director independence in the context of
conflict of interest transactions, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
67. Clarke, supra note 27, at 80. The law may contemplate that non-management directors
function as a brain trust, as protectors of minority shareholders’ interests against the actions of
dominant shareholders, as gatekeepers who use their voting power to ensure the corporation
complies with external legal standards, as whistleblowers who alert external authorities to
noncompliance with legal obligations, or as authorities who certify that the corporation is in
compliance with law. Id. at 80-83. Conflict of interest transactions are sometimes described as
“related party transactions.” See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, §§ 8.60-8.64 (2005).
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for audit committee independence and requires that the SEC require the
stock exchange self-regulatory organizations to mandate that listed
companies comply with the independence standards or face delisting. 68
Under SOA, independence is broadly defined as an absence of financial,
business, and familial ties to the corporation. 69
Stock exchange rules require independence on board committees,
including the audit, nominating, and compensation committees. 70 Also,
listed companies are required to have a certain number of independent
directors. 71 Generally, independence is defined as a director who does
not accept any compensatory fee from the corporation, other than fees
accepted in his capacity as a director, and who is not an affiliate—a
controlling shareholder—of the corporation. 72
Commentators to the SEC’s proposed rule implementing SOA’s
independence requirements point mostly to a concern among
corporations that the federal rules may prove too inflexible to benefit
corporations given the great variety among corporate governance
structures, board compositions, and board member knowledge of
Also, commentators have
auditing and accounting practices. 73

68. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)). See also
Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act (as added by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 301), 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm.
69. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)) (defining
independence); Securities Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(1) (17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3) (defining
“affiliated person” for purposes of section 301).
70. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.04 (requiring that the
nominating/corporate governance committee is “composed entirely of independent directors”). See
also id. at § 303A.05 (requiring that the compensation committee is “composed entirely of
independent directors”). The New York Stock Exchange requires that listed companies have audit
committees that meet the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley § 301. See id. at § 303A.06. See also
NASDAQ, Inc., Manual § 4350(d)(2), available at http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/
display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=18 (requiring that the audit committee is composed entirely of
independent directors). See generally Clarke, supra note 27, at 86-91 (comparing various
committee powers under the SOA, the NYSE and Nasdaq rules). For discussion of enforcement of
the independence requirements see infra Section II.C.3.
71. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.01 (requiring that
independent directors comprise a majority on listed company boards). See also NASDAQ, Inc.,
Manual, supra note 70, at § 4350(d)(2)(A) (requiring independent directors comprise a majority on
listed company boards).
72. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.02; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451, 14,452 (Mar. 25, 2003); NASDAQ,
Inc., Manual, supra note 70, at § 4350(c).
73. Commentators pointed out that perhaps the self-regulatory organizations were best suited
to set additional independence criteria beyond the audit committee independence requirements. See
Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees Exchange Act (as added by SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 301) supra note 68, at § II.A.1.
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expressed concerns about the potential lack of qualified individuals who
However, many
could serve as independent board members. 74
corporations already had some of the reforms in place. 75
One rationale behind independence requirements at both the federal
and state levels is that an independent director would be less likely to act
due to cognitive bias and against shareholders’ interests. 76 Whether
defined on a transactional basis, as at the state level, or defined in the
abstract and in the absence of a transaction, as at the federal level, all of
the definitions of independence contemplate that a director truly can be
systematically unbiased. However, the rules seek to address bias arising
from financial and other ties to management, not worldview bias.
B.

What Do Management Directors Do and What Roles and Functions
Does U.S. Federal and State Law Envision for Management
Directors?

According to CalPERS, the Chief Executive Officer’s primary
function is to manage the day-to-day operations of a company and to
speak publicly on its behalf. 77 Additionally, the CEO recommends the
company’s policy and strategic direction, subject to board approval. 78
The BRT provides a more detailed statement on the roles of the
chief executive and senior managers. The CEO and senior management
develop long-term strategic plans as well as annual operating plans and
budgets and submit them to the board for approval. 79 Also, senior
management is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the
strategic plan, management of the corporation’s “overall risk profile,”
and preparation of the corporation’s financial statements. 80
The BRT emphasizes that the CEO should be “a person of
integrity,” who will, with senior executives, establish an ethical

74. See, e.g., id. at § II.A.5 (discussing the SEC’s attempt to balance independence
requirements with the need to find qualified board nominees to serve on audit committees), §
II(F)(1) (discussing the SEC’s recognition that issuers may need time under the new rule to find
qualified audit committee members).
75. For example, corporations increasingly had begun to appoint a majority of nonmanagement directors on boards.
76. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 106. Clarke also discusses how the different functions give
rise to different definitions of who is independent. Id. at 84-86.
77. CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 48, at 17.
78. Id.
79. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 54, at 1011.
80. Id. at 11.
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corporate culture. 81 To ensure ethical corporate operation, the Business
Roundtable recommends that a CEO be “a person of integrity”
responsible for the corporation’s adherence to “the highest ethical
Although independent directors may be ultimately
standards.” 82
responsible for a corporation’s ethical climate, the senior executives are
responsible for establishing and designing ethics compliance programs,
and for ensuring the existence of a process to alert senior executives and
the board to red flags indicating unethical corporate conduct. 83
The standard of review for management directors’ actions is the
same essentially as the standard of review for non-management
directors’ actions. However, courts expect that management directors
will be more familiar with day-to-day operations, and review
management director actions with that expectation in mind.
The above discussion highlights that different behavioral norms
exist for management and non-management directors, and that different
expectations exist for management and non-management directors with
respect to bias. The next section examines how state and federal law
reviews director behavior, especially with regard to board risk evaluation
and shareholder claims of structural bias.
C.

State and Federal Review of Directors’ Actions
1. State Court Review

Corporate directors owe a duty to act with due care, with loyalty,
and in good faith. 84 Directors as a group are expected to exercise care in
decision-making and to fully deliberate making the rational decisions of
a reasonable director under like circumstances. 85 If they do, then absent
a conflict of interest, courts grant their decisions deferential review
under the business judgment standard of review. 86 If they do not, then
directors may be required to prove that their actions are fair. 87

81. Id. at 12.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (2005); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds).
85. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (2005).
86. See Burch, supra note 42, at 503-06 (describing business judgment doctrine and court
review of directors’ decisions).
87. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8
DEL. C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007). While Delaware’s statute (and other states’ statutes) authorizes
corporations to eliminate directors’ personal liability for breaches of the duty of care, the statute
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Courts have at times applied an explicit or implicit, traditional,
cost-benefit approach to review director decision-making.88 Courts may
examine whether directors engaged in proper deliberation of costs and
benefits; however, under business judgment review, courts will not
question whether directors properly weighed those costs and benefits. 89
Courts have found that those decisions lack due care in only a handful of
cases. 90 For example, in Joy v. North, Judge Winter explained that the
business judgment rule provides incentives for directors not to undertake
“overly cautious” decisions. 91 The case involved a series of loans by
Citytrust to Katz Corporation, a property developer that was undergoing
increasing financial difficulties. 92 Judge Winter evaluated the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success in proving that the directors breached their duty of
care by comparing the potential benefit of the loans—”the interest [that
Citytrust] could have earned in less risky, more diversified loans”—to
the potential risks—the loss of an increasingly large of amount of
principal loaned to Katz. 93 Judge Winter found that the plaintiff’s
chances of success were high. (The bank was in a classic “no win”
situation.) 94

does not authorize corporations to eliminate liability for breach of the duty of loyalty. Id. Further,
in theory the statute only authorizes corporations to limit directors’ personal liability—it does not
eliminate directors’ personal liability for due care breaches. In practice, directors rarely face
personal liability for breach of due care.
88. For explicit cost-benefit analysis dealing with the application of the business judgment
rule, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), in which the court stated:
[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the
interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses,
while the alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit. Shareholders
can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best
choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in
others. Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not
bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the
volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly
riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.
Id. at 886.
89. Proper evaluation of risk in these circumstances involves full consideration of the pros
and the cons of a particular course of action.
90. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1089-93 (2006).
91. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
92. See id. at 882.
93. Id. at 896.
94. The court stated:
The loss to Citytrust resulted from decisions which put the bank in a classic
“no win” situation. The Katz venture was risky and increasingly so. By
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Judge Winter compared the case to Litwin v. Allen, another example
of explicit court review of director risk-taking strategies. 95 In Litwin, a
bank purchased bonds with a seller’s option to repurchase at the sale
price. 96 If the market value of the bonds increased above the sale price
(the option price) then the seller would repurchase the bonds at the lower
price (the option price) and resell them at the market price. Thus, the
purchaser would lose the difference between the sale price (the option
price) and the value of the bonds at the time of repurchase. If the market
value of the bonds decreased, then the seller would not repurchase the
bonds. The buyer would sell the bonds on the market for less than the
price at which he purchased them. The court found that the defendant
directors who agreed to the terms of this deal breached their fiduciary
duty to the shareholders because the directors entered into a transaction
in which there was no possibility of a gain on the original sale. 97
Management directors may be held to a higher standard of care
under some state statutes. 98 Management directors are expected to know
more about day-to-day operations and to use that knowledge fully when
making decisions. 99 Courts at times, again implicitly or explicitly,
indicate that management directors’ actions will be reviewed under a
Nonetheless, management
somewhat more exacting standard. 100
directors are protected by the business judgment doctrine, exculpatory
provisions, and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. 101
If a plaintiff claims that directors breached the duty of loyalty,

continuing extensions of substantial amounts of credit the bank subjected the
principal to those risks although its potential gain was no more than the
interest it could have earned in less risky, more diversified loans. In a real
sense, there was a low ceiling on profits but only a distant floor for losses.
Id.
95. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. 1940).
96. See id. at 676.
97. Id. at 697-98. In the traditional language of investment risk assessment, the court stated:
Although, as I have said, there is no case precisely in point, it would seem that if it is
against public policy for a bank, anxious to dispose of some of its securities, to agree to
buy them back at the same price, it is even more so where a bank purchases securities
and gives the seller the option to buy them back at the same price, thereby incurring the
entire risk of loss with no possibility of gain other than the interest derived from the
securities during the period that the bank holds them.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8
DEL. C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007) (all directors took a unified position on the legal issues and so
were treated as one).
101. See Black et al., supra note 90, at 1089-94.
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courts first review whether the directors (or a board committee) were
disinterested and independent with respect to the challenged
transaction. 102 Definitions of disinterest and independence vary, but
generally a director is interested in the transaction if he or she has a
financial interest in the transaction (or if he or she has a familial
relationship with someone who has a financial interest in the
transaction), and a director lacks independence if the director cannot
make a decision uninfluenced by management. 103 For example, a
significant financial interest in the transaction, including a philanthropic
interest, may render a director not disinterested. 104 A significant
incentive to remain on the board of directors, such as stock options that
only vest if a director remains on the board, may render a director nonindependent. 105 However, “[a]llegations of mere personal friendship or
a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.” 106
Common law rules require a review of the entire fairness of
directors’ decisions if there are conflicts of interest, absent approval or
ratification of the transaction by disinterested and independent directors,
or by a majority of disinterested shareholders. 107 One rationale for strict
review is that if a conflict of interest exists, then there is a higher risk
that director self-interest will bias assessment of the costs and benefits of
a decision. Entire fairness review is the mechanism state courts use to
102. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63. Historically at common law, conflict of
interest transactions were void. Over time, courts developed a doctrine of judicial review of conflict
transactions. Under this review, conflict transactions were voidable if the transactions were “unfair”
to the corporation or to shareholders. In reviewing these transactions, courts examine whether the
price and other terms of the deal are fair, and whether the negotiations (between the parties) were
fair. Moreover, courts have developed mechanisms by which directors, officers and controlling
shareholders may seek from shareholders or independent directors prior approval or ratification of
self-interested transactions. MELVIN AARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 434-63 (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 2001).
103. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60.
104. Michael Bobelian, Uncompromising Friendship, 4 CORP. COUNS. 6, 38 (2004) (“Last
summer a Delaware Chancery Court judge ruled that Joseph Grundfest couldn't be considered an
independent director at Oracle Corporation because the company had significant philanthropic ties
to Stanford University, where Grundfest is a law professor ["Non-Independence Day," August
2003].”).
105. Id. (“[T]his past January another chancery court judge found that Scott Cook wasn't an
independent director at eBay, Inc., because he held stock options in the company that would vest
only if he remained on the board.” Cook's future appointment as a director, “in turn, rested with
eBay's non-independent directors ["Spinning into Trial," April].”).
106. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (noting that directors’ personal ties to
Stewart did not render them non-independent and unable to make unbiased decisions about whether
derivative litigation should proceed).
107. See, e.g., Lewis v. Austen, 1999 WL 378125, at *4 (Del.Ch. June 2, 1999).
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ensure that corporations and shareholders are not harmed by directors’
pecuniary conflicts of interest. 108 Under this standard, courts review
directors’ actions to determine whether, in the course of a transaction,
the shareholders on the whole received a fair value for their investment
and if the process by which directors negotiated the transaction mimics
an arms length bargaining process. 109 Director action—for example,
compensation decisions, special litigation committee recommendations,
and management buy-outs and other related-party transactions—which
would otherwise receive review under the entire fairness standard, are
subject to the more deferential business judgment standard if the
transaction is approved or ratified by independent and disinterested
directors (or majority shareholders). 110
As a practical matter, non-management directors often are
disinterested and independent with respect to conflict of interest
transactions. 111 Non-management director review and approval cleanses
board decisions that may be subject to shareholder attack due to board
conflicts of interest. 112 Thus, in practice, a disinterested, independent,
non-management director’s most important function from a state court
litigation perspective is to monitor related party transactions for
compliance with law and insulate the board from shareholder suits for
conflict of interest transactions. 113 Again, under statutory approaches,
an unfair transaction that has not been reviewed and approved by
independent and disinterested non-management directors may be
overturned by the court. In these situations directors may be subject to
monetary penalties. 114
2. State Judicial and Legislative Approaches to Shareholder
Claims of Director Bias
Bias is commonly viewed as “a particular tendency or inclination,
esp[ecially] one that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question;

108. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 104 (explaining whether state law independence
requirements work to protect shareholders from overreaching depends on whether shareholders sue
and whether courts fairly will judge the case).
109. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 2005).
110. See Lewis, 1999 WL 378125, at *4.
111. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 106 (explaining protection from litigation may be one reason
why corporations appoint independent directors to boards).
112. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61-8.63.
113. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 107-08.
114. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31.
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prejudice.” 115 Social science researchers have identified several forms
of bias, including status quo bias, overconfidence bias, availability
effect, and probability neglect. Also, courts have recognized the threat
that cognitive bias may “corrupt the directors’ judgment.” 116 However,
legal norms reflect a limited view of influence-corrupting bias, whereas,
social science research suggests a broader view of bias that distorts
decision-making and risk perception. 117
Given the availability and use of mechanisms to cleanse conflict
transactions, state courts have taken a somewhat skeptical view to
shareholder claims that directors’ decisions are nonetheless biased. 118 A
plaintiff who challenges whether a director is disinterested and
independent may succeed on her claim if she can prove facts
demonstrating that the board either lacked independence or had a
financial, business, or personal interest in the transaction. 119 In contrast,
courts often disregard claims that directors are biased due to a “there but
for the grace of God go I”-type sympathy for defendant directors, or due
to other incentives. 120 Certain types of bias fail to indicate a conflict of
interest without additional evidence of improper influence. 121
3. Federal Review
Corporate boards face different requirements with respect to
director independence under federal law. 122 The rules contemplate that
there is a need for systematic board independence, regardless of the
existence of related-party and other conflict of interest transactions. 123
Thus, under federal law the distinction between non-management
directors and management directors is important for compliance with
stock exchange rules.
A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty per se does not exist
under federal statutes or federal common law. Enforcement of federal
independence requirements includes liability under the federal securities

115. THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 202 (2d ed. 2006).
116. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 108 (1985).
117. See id. at 85-108.
118. See Lewis v. Austen, 1999 WL 378125, at *4 (Del.Ch. June 2, 1999).
119. Id.
120. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
121. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1053-54 (Del. 2004).
122. See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text.
123. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 84 (explaining that a theme in corporate law scholarship is
that independent directors serve as a check on the agency cost problem).
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laws for false or misleading disclosures and delisting for noncompliance
with self-regulatory organization rules.
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE
The body of empirical research on the relationship between outside
directors, independent directors, and corporate performance has grown
in recent years. 124 This research is not wholly persuasive that the
presence of outside or independent directors has a positive impact on
economic measures of firm success, such as stock price or higher tender
offers for target company stock. 125 Thus, some use the research results
to question the value of rules-based independence regimes, such as that
exemplified by SOA and the listing exchanges. 126
Others point to the fact that some studies rely on directors’ reports
of independence; boards may use inconsistent standards to determine if
directors are independent. Also, cross-study comparisons are difficult
because some examine whether having non-management directors on the
board has a positive impact on economic measures of firm success,
while other studies examine whether having independent and
disinterested directors on the board has a positive impact on economic
measures of firm success. As described above, non-management
directors are not necessarily disinterested or independent under state and
federal law. To some degree, the studies try to determine whether value
exists when unbiased (as in independent and disinterested) directors
monitor corporate executives.
Recent empirical research conducted by Yale Law School’s
Cultural Cognition Project may provide a different view of cognitive
bias on corporate boards. The Yale researchers sought (and continue to
gather) data to test a theorized connection between a respondent’s
cultural identity, demographic characteristics such as gender and race,
and perceptions of risks attributed to certain socially charged policies—
gun control, environmental control, and access to abortions. The
researchers sought an explanation for the “white male effect”—a phrase
that refers to research findings that a discrete group of white males
consistently rate the risks of a variety of hazards (e.g., climate change,
cigarette smoking, street drugs, and AIDS) at a much lower level than
females and nonwhites. 127 When compared to the rest of the study
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Michaud & Margaram, supra note 29, at 5-10.
See Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 19-21.
See id. at 53-54.
Melissa L. Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield,
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population, these men were more highly-educated, affluent, and
politically conservative than the other respondents.
The Yale
researchers hypothesized that the “white male effect” may be an artifact
of the norms generally held by this group of white males and the social
roles threatened or supported by certain social policies embedded in
regulation. Corporate law also embodies certain policy choices; these
policy choices have lately become hotly contested. 128 The Yale study
may illuminate how cultural norms, race, and gender interact to
influence board evaluation of risks and decision-making.
After a discussion of how risk evaluation operates in corporate law,
the section summarizes the theory of CIP cognition and the results of the
Yale study on this type of cognitive bias.
A.

The Role of Risk in Corporate Law

Generally, risk is narrowly defined as “exposure to the chance of
injury or loss.” 129 In this narrow context, risk is assessed by weighing
the expected benefits versus the expected costs. A more expansive
definition of risk includes not only an assessment of an expected benefit
versus an expected cost, but also “considerations such as uncertainty,
dread, catastrophic potential, controllability, equity [and] risk to future
generations.” 130 Risk is often defined in the context of a specific
field. 131 For example, in the context of investment decisions an accepted
definition of risk is “the chance that an investment’s actual return will be
different than expected.” 132
Gender, Race and Perceived Risk: The ‘White Male’ Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159, 160
(2002). The complete list of twenty-five hazards, from higher perceived risk to lower perceived
risk, is: cigarette smoking, street drugs, AIDS, stress, chemical pollution, nuclear waste, motor
vehicle accidents, drinking alcohol, sun tanning, ozone depletion, pesticides in food, outdoor air
quality, blood transfusions, coal/oil burning plants, climate change, bacteria in food, nuclear power
plants, food irradiation, storms and floods, genetically engineered bacteria, radon in homes, highvoltage power lines, VDTs [video display terminals], medical X-rays, and commercial air travel.
Id. at 161.
128. The policy choices perhaps are not as hotly contested as the policies underlying the
regulation of abortions, the environment, and access to guns. However, recent changes in federal
corporate law have been highly politicized.
129. THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1660 (2d ed. 2006). A
review of several sources reveals that risk is generally defined as a weighing of expected loss or
injury.
130. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment
Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, § I.C. (1997).
131. See, e.g., Dictionary.com, Risk, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/risk (last visited
Aug. 16, 2007) (listing thirteen definitions of risk, in several contexts including insurance,
medicine, crime, and investments).
132. Id.
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The notion of risk—defined as weighing the expected benefits of a
transaction versus the expected costs—in the context of corporate
governance is part of the foundation of corporate law. For example, the
“traditional” conception of the corporation is that it exists for the
pecuniary benefit of its shareholders. A corollary is that the function of
corporate management is to operate the corporation to maximize
shareholders’ pecuniary gain. Some disagree with this traditional
conception of the function of corporations and corporate executives. But
even these commentators use the language of risk assessment; that is,
they discuss corporate and executive goals in terms of maximizing
shareholders’ or stakeholders’ gain given the risk characteristics of
certain strategies. 133
Shareholders are expected to diversify to minimize investment risks
due to economic cycles, bad management, and other risk factors. 134 For
example, in Basic v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court adopted
the notion that public securities markets are efficient – that is, all
publicly known information is reflected in the price of shares. 135 This
efficient capital markets theory presupposes that shareholders may
diversify stock holdings, and reduce shareholder’s risk of bad decisionmaking on the part of the management of any particular company. 136
The notion of shareholder diversification underlies elements of a federal
cause of action against public company directors and management for
misstatements and omissions in violation of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 Section 10(b). 137
Courts, at times explicitly but more often implicitly, acknowledge
that boards engage in risk assessments. 138 Courts reason that generally
directors are in a better position to weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular business decision—from selling the corporation’s assets to
devising internal controls—than are judges and legislators. 139 Under the
business judgment doctrine, courts give great deference to the unbiased,
good faith decisions of directors—even if later events prove that the
directors’ assessment of the risks was incorrect. 140 Courts give lesser
133. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Processor Financial Innovation,
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX.L.REV. 1273, 1278-83 (1991).
134. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
135. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-49 (1988).
136. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
137. Id.
138. See infra note 229. See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 85-86, 108-09.
139. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 109.
140. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 DEL.
C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007)).
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deference to decisions involving board conflicts of interest and little or
no deference to fraud, illegal conduct, and bad faith board decisions.141
For example, if the risks are entirely business risks, courts and
legislatures defer to the judgment of business persons and the risk of loss
for bad or negligent director decision-making falls on the
shareholders. 142 Alternatively, if a business risk arises from conflicts of
interest, courts and legislatures give less deference to the judgment of
business persons; the risk of loss for fraudulent, illegal, and bad faith
conduct falls on the directors. 143
The above discussion is not an exhaustive explanation of the
positive and normative values assigned to the function of risk in
corporate law. Instead, it offers some illustrations of the importance of
the risk assessment concept in regulating and governing corporations.
B.

Emotions and Risk Perception

Recent studies show that individuals lack information, time, and
capacity to maximize their utility and make decisions in their own best
interests—that is, to act as rational economic actors. 144 Instead they
resort to heuristic substitutes to evaluate risks. 145 One heuristic
substitute is emotion—i.e., individuals often act out of their emotions
and not out of a rational evaluation of utility-maximizing strategies. 146
When individuals rely on an affective response, their actions reflect bias
because emotions distort information processing. 147
A court may be willing to tolerate a certain amount of emotionally
distorted information processing. For example, courts may assume that
the greater the amount of compensation received, the more likely the
compensation will influence the director’s judgment. 148 Director
141. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]usiness judgment rule extends only as far as the
reasons which justify its existence. Thus, it does not apply in cases in which corporate decision
lacks business purpose, is tainted by conflict of interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win
decision, or results from obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.”
(internal citations omitted)).
142. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 108-09.
143. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner recently conducted a study that
shows that boards rarely bear the risk of loss due to a combination of exculpatory provisions,
insurance provisions, and state statutes that allow indemnification of directors’ expenses for the
costs of defending a law suit. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
144. Kahan, supra note 12, at 2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2-3.
148. See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-54 (Del. 2004) (balancing evidence of
friendship versus evidence of a professional reputation to be upheld).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 4
BURCH_FINAL

536

3/23/2009 2:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:509

compensation of $250 per hour may be high enough to constitute bias, 149
but a nominal fee, which directors may even agree to return, may be too
small for courts to perceive an emotionally distorted decision.
Emotions aid cultural evaluations of risk. 150 Individuals draw on
their emotions “to perceive what stance toward risks coheres with their
values.” 151 Values derive from cultural norms. 152 Individuals use
emotions to form “rational attitudes about what it would mean for their
cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is
dangerous and worthy of regulation.” 153 An individual takes emotions
into account in deciding whether a particular set of values or norms
expressed by a particular legal rule is congruent with her own set of
norms. 154 For example, if an individual values egalitarian norms, then
the person is more likely to favor increasing environmental regulation. 155
Such regulation would limit commercial activities; if those activities
were limited, then there would be fewer distinctions in wealth and
economic status and a more egalitarian world. On the other hand, if an
individual values hierarchical and individualistic norms, then the person
is less likely to favor increasing environmental regulation because such
regulation would signal, “a challenge to the prerogatives and
competence of social and governmental elites.” 156
Classical economic theory is a theoretical basis for much of
corporate law. The theory suggests that emotions (such as those that
might arise if one’s social status is threatened) do not play a role in the
cognition of risk. 157 Instead, cognition of risk may produce emotions as
a “reactive byproduct.” 158 Under this view, individuals “process
information about risky undertakings in a way that maximizes their
expected utility.” 159 In other words, when making decisions, emotions
do not sway rational individuals. Rational individuals engage in a
“utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits.” 160 Thus, more information

149. See Telxon v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 265-66 (Del. 2002).
150. Kahan, supra note 12, at 2-10.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 9-10.
155. Id.
156. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 10.
157. As described above in Section II, much of corporation law is grounded in classical
theories of economics.
158. Kahan, supra note 12, at 5.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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regarding the costs and benefits of certain courses of action should lead
to a correct assessment of the risks of certain courses of action.
However, a growing body of research suggests that, contrary to
economic theories, more information does not make for better decisions
or better risk evaluations. Rather, emotions play a role in this cognitive
process.
Corporate law has a renewed emphasis on ensuring the adequate
flow of information. While this is a good thing, more information about
board roles, the risks of engaging in certain borderline activities, and the
costs and benefits of certain corporate strategies may not lead to better
evaluation of the risks.
C.

The Yale Law School Cultural Cognition Project’s Study on
Cultural Bias and the White Male Effect

Empirical research shows that risk perceptions are skewed across
gender and race. 161 In particular, evidence shows that “race and gender
differences in risk perception can be attributed to a discrete class of
highly risk-skeptical white men . . . [who] hold certain anti-egalitarian
and individualistic attitudes” in comparison to members of the total
population. 162 This skewing of risk perception has been referred to as
the “white male effect.” 163 Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil,
Paul Slovic and C.K. Mertz, researchers at Yale Law School, built upon
this body of work by conducting an empirical study to determine
whether gender and race alone or cultural norms account for varying risk
perceptions, and in particular for the “white male effect.” 164
1. The Study
The Kahan study was designed to test whether the “white male
effect” was an artifact solely of race and gender or an artifact of cultural
norms that may well “feature either gender or race differentiation or both
in social roles involving putatively dangerous activities.” 165 “The core
idea, which can be called the cultural cognition thesis, is that culture is

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 4
BURCH_FINAL

538

3/23/2009 2:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:509

prior to fact on charged policy issues.” 166 Cultural cognition shapes
beliefs about the value of certain laws and policy, and “what individuals
believe the consequences of such policies to be.” 167 The cultural
cognition thesis derives from two lines of social science research:
research on cultural norms and risk perception, and research on how
group membership affects cognitive processes. 168
Research on cultural norms and risk perception (known as the
cultural theory of risk perception) shows that “individuals . . . selectively
credit and dismiss claims of societal danger based on whether the
putatively hazardous activity is one that defies or instead conforms to
their cultural norms.” 169 According to this position, competing norms
are classified across two dimensions: “group” and “grid.” 170 In this
typology:
[A] high group worldview supports a communitarian society, in which
collective needs trump individual ones. A low group worldview, in
contrast, coheres with an individualist social order, in which persons
are expected to secure their own needs without collective assistance
and without collective interference. A high grid worldview favors a
hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, rights,
political offices and the like are distributed on the basis of conspicuous
and largely fixed social characteristics—such as gender, race, class,
lineage. A low grid worldview favors an egalitarian society, in which
171
such characteristics are denied significance.

Research on group membership and cognitive bias demonstrates not
166. Posting
of
Dan
Kahan
to
Empirical
Legal
Studies
Blog,
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/cultural_cognit.html (June 6, 2006 , 5:57
EST) (emphasis in original).
167. Id. In a recent blog posting, Dan Kahan offered the following hypothesis:
On guns, for example, hierarchical and individualist worldviews predict the view that
guns are "safe" among both men *and* women; however, the effect of those worldviews
on men is much much [sic] larger. That fits our theory insofar as we say hierarchical and
individualist men have a bigger investment in access to guns to perform roles that are
status-enhancing for them. But insofar as inividualist and hierarchist women still are
more disposed to see guns as "safe" than are solidarist and egalitarian ones, it seems
strange to say they are holding back on status-anxiety grounds; female hierarchs and
individualists are motivated by status-anxiety relative to egalitarians and solidarists, but
not nearly *as much* as male hierarchs and individualists.
Posting
of
Dan
Kahan
to
Empirical
Legal
Studies
Blog,
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/white_male_stat.html (June 5, 2006,
10:51 EST).
168. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 3.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id.
171. Kahan, supra note 166.
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only that individuals adopt as their own the beliefs of certain groups to
which they belong—”in groups”—but also individuals tend to reject
factual information when the information reflects beliefs held by “out
groups.” 172
The authors posited that gender and race in and of themselves are
insufficient to explain why certain individuals perceive risks differently
from other groups. 173 Instead, individuals are biased in a manner that
furthers an individual’s status in society. 174 Status is dependent on
cultural norms subscribed to by the “in-group.” 175 Thus, status is
threatened by those holding opposing norms. 176 This phenomenon is
known as “cultural-identity-protective cognition.” 177
The Yale researchers investigated the existence of a correlation
between gender, race, and certain cultural norms or worldviews, and
between cultural norms and perceptions of risk. 178 The aim of the study
was to determine whether identity-protective cognition might account
more closely for differences in risk perception. 179
The study tested norms classified across two dimensions—
hierarchical
versus
egalitarian
and
individualistic
versus
communitarian. 180 The authors of the Yale study theorized that
individuals are members of one of four groups, classified as hierarchicalindividualists, hierarchical-communitarians, egalitarian-individualists,
and egalitarian-communitarians; that members of each group hold
distinctly different views about the risks of putatively dangerous
activities; and that those views conform to the values and norms
associated with a particular worldview. 181 Further, the authors of the
172. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 6.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 6-8.
178. Id. at 8-9.
179. Id. at 9-10.
180. Id. at 8-9.
181. Id. at 4-6. The theory of cultural identity protective risk perception posits that
“individuals adopt beliefs congenial to the groups to which they belong precisely because their
holding such beliefs promotes their groups’ interests.” Id. at 7. Also, the theory of risk perception
identifies those group-held norms and values that are most salient to influence individuals’
perceptions of what beliefs are in the individual’s own best interests.
[I]n the real-world we associate with myriad diverse groups . . . . It’s not merely
implausible but logically impossible for persons to react with identity-protective
cognition with respect to all the beliefs that might predominate among all such groups . .
. . “Group-grid” furnishes a parsimonious typology of highly salient commitments that
are likely to shape individuals’ identities, and determine their group-based affinities, in a
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Yale study theorized that gender and racial variance in risk perception
might correlate with worldviews. Moreover, gender and racial variance
within a worldview might occur depending on “whose cultural
identity . . . is being enabled or interfered with by some putatively
dangerous activity.” 182 In other words, while cultural norms adhering in
a worldview may account for differences in risk perception more than
any other personal characteristic, cultural norms in combination with
other characteristics—such as race and gender—may motivate risk
perceptions especially “when their shared norms feature gender or race
differentiation with respect to social roles involving such an activity.” 183
Also, the Yale study examined individuals’ perceptions of risks to
societal and personal health and safety posed by gun control,
environmental dangers, and abortions—highly contentious social
issues. 184 For example, assertions of environmental risk may be
perceived as “symbolizing a challenge to the prerogatives and
competence of social and governmental elites.” 185 Thus, hierarchical
persons should be more dismissive of environmental risks than
egalitarians. 186 Moreover, male hierarchists should be more dismissive
of environmental risks than female hierarchists, because “[w]ithin a
hierarchical worldview, women are primarily assigned to domestic roles,
men to public ones within civil society and within the government.”187
Racial variance in perceptions of environmental risks may be due to a
tendency for “minorities . . . to be disproportionately egalitarian in their
outlooks . . . .” 188 As another example, “[t]he social roles that guns
enable and the virtues they symbolize are stereotypically male roles and
virtues.” 189 Moreover, gun ownership historically has been associated
with prerogatives belonging to white, hierarchical males. 190 Therefore,
white, hierarchical males should be highly skeptical of the risks

manner that transcends the scores of associations they might happen to form with likeand unlike-minded persons.
Id.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/4

32

Burch: The Myth of the Unbiased Director
BURCH_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:45 PM

THE MYTH OF THE UNBIASED DIRECTOR

541

associated with gun ownership and disfavor gun control, much more so
than female hierarchists or hierarchists of color disfavor gun control. 191
Finally, the abortion debate may reflect tension between “norms
conferring status on women who successfully occupy professional
roles . . . with . . . patriarchal norms that assign status to women for
occupying domestic roles.” 192 Thus, relatively hierarchical individuals
would disfavor the free availability of abortions. 193 In addition, female
hierarchists “would be the most receptive of all to the claim that abortion
is dangerous” because “they are the ones whose identities are most
threatened by abortion’s symbolic denigration of motherhood.” 194 The
authors predicted that “commitment to hierarchical norms . . . would
have a less dramatic impact in accentuating the abortion-risk concerns of
men.” 195 Finally, “any race effect on abortion risk perceptions would
originate in either the correlation of race with cultural outlooks or an
interaction between race and cultural worldviews.” 196
The Kahan study on the influence of cultural norms on risk
perception was just one of several conducted in the Cultural Cognition
Project at Yale University.
2. Study Design
Eighteen hundred people nationwide participated in a telephone
survey. 197 The researchers collected information on various personal
demographic characteristics of the participants and on the norms each
held. 198 The telephone survey collected other personal characteristics
that have been known to correlate with predilection for risk. 199
The questionnaire was designed to measure worldviews with
respect to three hypotheses. The first hypothesis was “that relatively
hierarchical and individualistic worldviews would diminish concern with
environmental risks, whereas relatively egalitarian and communitarian
worldviews would accentuate it.” 200 The second was that:
[p]ersons of hierarchical and individualistic orientations should be

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 10.

33

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 4
BURCH_FINAL

542

3/23/2009 2:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:509

expected to worry more about being rendered defenseless because of
the association of guns with hierarchical social roles . . . and with
hierarchical and individualistic virtues . . . . Relatively egalitarian and
communitarian respondents should worry more about gun violence
because of the association of guns with patriarchy and racism and with
distrust of and indifference to the well-being of strangers. 201

The third hypothesis was that egalitarian individualistic women
would see abortion as safe, in line with their commitment to norms that
confer status on women “who master professional roles,” while
relatively hierarchical individuals would see abortion as more risky. 202
3. Study Results
The study’s results indicated that while individuals of certain races
and genders might be more likely to perceive risks in certain ways as a
group, race and gender alone did not account for differences in risk
perception. 203 Instead, perceptions of risk correlated positively with
norms that furthered social status, and not with objective measures of
risk. 204 In other words, individuals tended to minimize the risks of an
activity if the cultural status of the individuals as a group depended on
that activity. 205
Generally, “[d]ifferences in the perceptions of white males and
others for all risks were relatively muted among persons holding
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews and were nonsignificant with
respect to gun risks and abortion risks.” 206 However, “[t]he difference
between the mean risk perceptions of white men those of white females
and minorities was pronounced among persons subscribing to
hierarchical worldviews for each of the risks examined.” 207 Also,
African-Americans
were
disproportionately
egalitarian
and
208
communitarian.
The researchers found that “cultural orientations explain gun-risk
perceptions better than any other factor, including one’s gender, race,
region of residence, community type, political ideology, personality

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 22, 25.
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type, and so forth.” 209 In addition, gender and race operated on
worldviews to influence risk perception. Indeed, male hierarchists and
individualists were motivated by status anxiety relative to male
egalitarians and solidarists, and much more so than female hierarchs. 210
Also, individualists were motivated by status anxiety relative to female
egalitarians and solidarists. 211 Further, “increasing hierarchical and
individualistic worldviews induce[d] greater risk-skepticism in white
males than in either white women or male or female nonwhites.” 212
Moreover, “risk skepticism about guns was most pronounced among
white male hierarchists and male individualists.” 213 This finding was
consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis about gun-risk perceptions. 214
The findings on environmental risks also confirmed the researchers’
hypotheses. First, “individualistic men and individualistic women react
with status-protecting skepticism when commerce and industry are
attacked as dangerous,” and more so than communitarians. 215 Second,
hierarchical men and hierarchical women worried less about
environmental risks than did egalitarians, but “women discounted
environmental risk less than men [discounted such risks] as their
respective orientations became more hierarchical.” 216 Third, race
variance “was attributable to the disproportionately egalitarian and
communitarian worldviews of African-Americans.” 217 In sum, the
statistical analysis revealed that “the white male effect for environmental
risks observed in the sample as a whole was, as hypothesized,
attributable in its entirety to the extreme risk skepticism that hierarchical
commitments induce in white males.” 218
The results on perceptions of abortion risks also were consistent
with the researchers’ hypotheses. 219 As respondents’ worldviews
became more hierarchical, they became more concerned about abortion
risks, and as their worldviews became more individualistic, they became
209. Kahan, supra note 166.
210. See Kahan, supra note 167.
211. See id.
212. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 25.
213. Kahan, supra note 167. Kahan further explained that “the hierarchic associations that
guns bear have historically been confined to whites, white male hierarchs have the biggest
investment of all in seeing guns as safe (indeed, we found, that such individuals believe that gun
ownership enhances rather than reduces public safety).” Id. (emphasis in original).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 22.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 23.
219. Id. at 27.
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less concerned about abortion risks. 220 The cultural orientation scales
added to the predictive power of the researchers’ cultural-identityprotective cognition theory. 221 Moreover, gender and race interacted
with cultural worldviews. For example, as their respective orientations
became more hierarchical, women worried about abortion risks more
than men worried about these risks. 222 Indeed, “all of the gender-related
variance in the sample was attributable to the extreme risk sensitivity
associated with being a white female Hierarch.” 223 However, “being an
African-American heighten[ed] concern about abortion risks
independent of cultural worldviews.” 224
IV. MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CIP COGNITION THROUGH
EDUCATION AND LEGAL RULES
Could CIP risk perception impact board decision-making in some
way that one really needs to worry about? Perhaps it could. To the
extent that certain cultural norms predominate on corporate boards, the
theory would suggest that CIP risk assessment bias may systematically
influence director decision-making. Further, the theory may allow
predictions about the kinds of decisions and scenarios that risk bias is
most likely to influence.
A.

What Does the Study Add to Our Understanding of How Cognitive
Biases May Operate in Director Decision-making?

The “white male effect” is a well documented form of risk bias. A
growing literature documents other types of bias. Yet, courts are
reluctant to give more scrutiny to directorial decision-making; some
explicitly disregard the effect of cognitive bias on board decisionmaking in certain contexts, including director review of conflict of
interest transactions and special litigation committee recommendations.
Where this disregard is not explicit, it is implicit in the operation of
business judgment doctrine.
Why should the results of the Yale study have any greater influence
over court review of decisions than previous research on risk perception,
cognitive bias, and emotion? The Yale study may add detail to our
understanding of the nature of the “common cultural bond” shared, and
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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it points to evidence of the impact of bias on decision-making,
specifically as it relates to risk evaluation. For example, the Yale
research has provided evidence of group bias that may lead to structural
bias on boards. Structural bias “generally refers to the prejudice that
members of the board of directors may have in favor of one another and
of management . . . [because of a] common cultural bond and [the]
natural empathy and collegiality shared by most directors,” the
management-dominated director selection and socialization process, and
“economic or psychological dependence upon or ties to the corporation’s
Structural bias is particularly an issue
senior executives.” 225
“[w]henever the interests of the directors are in conflict with those of
shareholders . . . .” 226
In a sense, the study makes structural bias more than just a theory
because it proves the existence of the effect of cultural norms on risk
perception, even if it does not prove the effect of the bond in specific
cases. Moreover, the study suggests that the type of bias resulting from
cultural status anxiety operates regardless of whether or not there is a
conflict between the board and shareholders.
The Yale study adds empirical support to the notion that cognitive
bias impacts board decision-making in a way that may harm
shareholders and perhaps that courts should recognize “the full variety of
influences” on director behavior. 227 This support did not exist at the
time the more influential cases dealing with executive conflict of interest
transactions were decided. For example, systematically underestimating
the risks of conflict transactions may lead a board to ignore red flags
indicating financial problems within the corporation. These problems
might have been correctable had the board earlier identified and
addressed the problem. Systematic under or overestimation of risk in a
particular institution indicates cognitive flaws in decision-making, which
should be addressed in a systematic and cognitive way.
The theory of CIP cognition may offer a social psychology
explanation for certain dysfunctional board mental processes and
behavior. Additionally, it may offer ways to neutralize the effects of

225. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
821, 824 (2004). Velasco identifies three “paradigms for understanding structural bias”: implicit
conspiracy (directors “consciously” pursue group interests), relationship bias (directors “favor
friends and colleagues over distant shareholders”), and unconscious, cognitive bias (a
“manifestation of ingroup bias”). Id. at 855.
226. Id. at 821.
227. J. Robert Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 100 (2006-2007).
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identity-protective cognition on individual and group decision-making.
The next section addresses how CIP risk assessment may affect board
behavior in three specific situations. It describes how director education
and changes in legal rules may mitigate the effects of CIP risk
assessment. It also addresses theoretical and practical objections to the
proposals.
B.

Specific Applications
1. Compensation Decisions

Directors might minimize the risks of overcompensation in order to
protect, by proxy, their own economic status. Hierarchical norms assign
males the breadwinner role. Attempts to limit the economic potential of
that role may threaten directors’ cultural identity. Thus, directors may
underestimate the risk that a compensation package is overvalued.
Current legal rules requiring independent compensation committee
review of executive compensation decisions, and the norms reflected in
those rules, would not mitigate the risk of bias.
A controversial implication of identity-protective cognition
suggests that courts should be less sanguine about according deference
to directors when reviewing claims that directors have breached their
fiduciary duty of care and wasted corporate assets by awarding excessive
compensation. 228 To the extent that the Yale study identifies a
systematic cultural-identity and status protective bias distorting director
business risk perception, courts should be alert to the possible need for
closer review of directors’ decision-making processes. The standard of
review would not require liability for mere mistakes or for negligent
decisions. The idea is to ensure that directors make more balanced
business judgments, not to replace directors’ business judgments with
the business judgment of the courts. Gross negligence could remain the
standard of review; this is merely an evolutionary, not revolutionary,
change in what it means to be reasonably informed. 229

228. The legal scholarship on structural bias suggests that court review of directors’ business
judgment might go beyond mere review of the procedural aspects of business decision-making and
touch on the substantive aspects. For example, Julian Velasco proposed a “substantive
reasonableness” standard, under which “the plaintiff should have to establish that the directors’
decision was unreasonable.” Velasco, supra note 225, at 876.
229. If courts articulate these norms as setting a standard of good practice, then “reasonable”
boards would follow these practices or risk liability (putting aside the issue of exculpatory statutes,
indemnification, and insurance). See Burch, supra note 42, at 527-28.
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In undertaking this review, courts could ask whether management
and the board sought arguments against a proposed course of action and
whether the board or board committee fully considered those arguments.
For example, courts could weigh evidence presented by directors that the
board “considered arguments against a course of action” and challenged
management on more controversial decisions. 230
Further, courts
routinely engage in weighing factors and so are well-positioned to
determine if boards appropriately identified and weighed a variety of
viewpoints. Moreover, plaintiffs should not bear the burden of
demonstrating that the decision-making process was flawed. Courts
should require directors to show balanced risk appraisals.
2. Independent Director Approval of Conflict of Interest
Transactions
As described in Section III of this Article, plaintiffs’ arguments in
favor of entire fairness review as a mechanism to address cognitive bias
generally have been unsuccessful even though courts have become more
willing over the last twenty years to entertain those arguments. 231
However, the bias resulting from identity-protective cognition may
indeed cause directors to underestimate the risks of conflict transactions,
even if the directors have no pecuniary interest in the transaction.
Historically, conflict transactions were presumptively void. 232
Today, a director’s ability to engage in conflict transactions reasonably
may be viewed as a necessary component of doing business and as
essential to maintain or enhance a director’s status in business and in
society. Legal rules have established the norm that directors without
certain financial, business, and personal conflicts may review relatedparty/conflict of interest transactions. By judging whether a conflict
transaction is in the best interests of the corporation, a director may
signal not only that he or she believes that the transaction is fair, but also
that it is fair for the director to make that judgment. This further
establishes financial, business, and personal conflicts—and not other
sources of bias—as the criteria that determines if the director is
impartial. These criteria become part of the status quo. Adherence to
this framework for evaluating bias reinforces stability, a hierarchical
norm, and protects a director’s hierarchical self-identity. Therefore, a

230. Paredes, supra note 24, at 750-51.
231. Velasco, supra note 225, at 840-41.
232. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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director may be predisposed to discount the impact of CIP bias and other
forms of cognitive bias on decision-making.
To the extent that a court requires an independent board committee
to show transactional fairness regardless of independent director
approval, the court is taking steps to counteract the effects of identityprotective cognition bias. Jurisdictions that require this showing may
offer plaintiffs more protection against the CIP risk assessment bias.
Jurisdictions adopting the Model Business Corporation Act, which shifts
the burden of proof to the plaintiffs to show waste, may not adequately
account for the risk of identity-protective cognition bias.
3. Special Litigation Committees
In a number of jurisdictions, derivative plaintiffs must make a
demand on the board when bringing a derivative lawsuit unless demand
is excused. In these jurisdictions, demand is excused if it would be
futile, i.e., the board operated under a conflict of interest when
undertaking the transaction and that conflict might be expected to
interfere with unbiased operation of the board’s business judgment.
Other jurisdictions require that demand is made on the board in all
cases. 233
If a shareholder names a majority of the board as defendants
because they had an interest in the transaction at the time, the board may
appoint a special board committee to review the shareholder’s demand.
The purpose of the committee is to determine if pursuing the litigation
would be in the best interests of the corporation as a whole. 234 If a
disinterested board makes a fully informed and reasonable decision not
to pursue the litigation, then the business judgment rule may fully
protect that decision.
Plaintiffs have argued, and some courts (a minority) have reasoned,
that members of special litigation committees might be reluctant to bring
derivative lawsuits not because the lawsuits are illegitimate, but because
the members of the special committee might identify with the defendants
and think, “there but for the grace of God go I.” 235 The study raises the
additional possibility that directors might seek dismissal to protect the
status of the firm as a hierarchy. Hierarchs, and hierarchical institutions,
tend to value the status quo and incremental moves. Suing management
is unlikely to be an incremental move. Also, hierarchies tend to value
233. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (West 2006).
234. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 cmt. (West 2006).
235. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
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stability and rational order. Management may perceive the derivative
lawsuit as disruptive. 236 Also, shareholder lawsuits may be a threat to
the hierarchical system of governance in which the CEO and directors,
not the shareholders, appear to be at the top of the corporate hierarchy.
Thus, CIP risk assessment creates a danger that the special litigation
committee will dismiss a lawsuit properly brought to vindicate
legitimate shareholder rights. 237
A majority of states (and federal courts applying state rules)
recognize the special litigation committee defense. 238 Several states
have codified the defense. 239 Most of these statutes are based on the
Model Business Corporation Act § 7.44. A minority of states recognize
a modified version of the defense. These states allow a trial court to
review the committee’s decision recommending that litigation be
terminated.
The level of review varies and generally requires
independence and some proof of fairness. 240 In these jurisdictions, the
236. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 89 (stating that “directors perceive the typical
derivative suit to be the unscrupulous strike suit,” feel an “affinity” with the defendants, and are
“particular[ly] concern[ed] that the defendants not be subjected needlessly to the opprobrium and
inconvenience of litigation”).
237. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147,
1166-69 (2002) (evidence shows firms who protect minority shareholders have higher valuations).
238. See, e.g., Roberts v. Alabama Power Company, 404 So.2d 629, 631-36 (Ala. 1981);
Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 636-38 (Colo. 1999); De Moya v. Fernandez, 559
So.2d 644, 645-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Millsap v. American Family Corporation, 208 Ga.
App. 230, 231-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Allied Ready Mix Company, Inc. ex rel. Mattingly v. Allen,
994 S.W.2d 4, 8-10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31 (N.Y. 1979);
Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70 Ohio App.3d 702, 705-08 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Cuker v. Mikalauskas,
547 Pa. 600, 611-14 (Pa. 1997).
239. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(f) (2007)(independent scrutiny standard); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-3634 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33- 724 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.07401(3) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-744, 14-3-744 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
30-1-744 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 632 (2007) (amended by 13-C § 755 and further
amended by S.P. 608, 2007 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 289); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.241 (West 2007);
see also Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (construing MINN.
STAT. § 302A.241); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.44 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-545, 35-21304 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2074 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293- A:7.44
(2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-44 (2007); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. art. 5.14, subs. F, H; VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.4 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.0744, 181.0744 (West 2007).
240. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-91 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law; trial court
is to weigh likely recovery, discounted by the probability of liability, against the costs to the
corporation of continuing the action), cert. den. sub nom., 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983),
and superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-724; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 787-89 (Del. 1981) (trial court is to apply its own "independent business judgment");
Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 814-26 (Mass. 1990) (trial court must determine whether committee's
decision was "reasonable and principled"); In re PSE & G Shareholder Lit., 315 N.J. Super. 323,
335-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (trial court must determine whether committee's decision
was "reasonable and principle[d]"); Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 468-74 (N.C. 1987) (trial court
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additional protections offered shareholders may counteract the effects of
CIP risk assessment bias.
C.

Critique

In any proposal that may expose directors to real liability, criticism
abounds. If boards are systematically and structurally dysfunctional,
then structural changes may be needed to neutralize the problem. The
question is not only whether the above legal and educational changes
would work, but whether the “cure” would be worse than the
dysfunction. 241
1. Shareholders Can Diversify Away the Risk that Nonmanagement Directors Will Not Exercise Unbiased Judgment
Shareholders freely chose the companies in which to invest.
Therefore, in theory, shareholders can choose to increase their
investment in companies that demonstrate more balanced decisionmaking. Moreover, shareholders could choose to construct a diversified
investment portfolio consisting of corporations assuming that some
corporations have better corporate governance and decision-making
practices than others. Thus, the shareholders’ risk may be reduced.
However, cognitive bias may be a structural problem across
corporations. If uncorrected, investment portfolio diversification across
U.S. publicly traded corporations would not defuse this problem.
2. Closer Judicial Scrutiny Will Lead to Greater Liability and
Fewer Qualified Individuals Will Want to Serve as Directors
The concern here is that greater scrutiny of directors’ decisions will
lead to the possibility of more director liability. This concern was raised
in the seminal case of Smith v. Van Gorkom. 242 However, several
counterarguments may be raised in response. First, although liability
insurance costs increased after Smith, this insurance protects directors
from personal liability. Second, although there was a decrease in the

must consider totality of circumstances, including committee's report, in deciding whether directors'
action was "just and reasonable"); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 222-26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(trial court must determine whether committee's decision was "reasonable and principled").
241. It is difficult to change a dysfunctional system, especially if it appears to those holding
power within the system that they are acting functionally.
242. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 DEL. C. §
102(b)(7) (West 2007).
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number of qualified directors who continued to serve, the decrease was
temporary. Third, although some directors may leave their positions due
to a concern that they would no longer be able to fulfill their increased
directorial functions, perhaps directors who do continue to serve will
understand their companies better and will make more legitimate
decisions, which should lead to less potential liability.
3. Directors Would Take Even Fewer Risks, at Shareholders’
Expense
Directors “might be dissuaded from taking even prudent risks and
might become too tentative” once more attention is focused on risk. 243
Alternatively, directors may realize that activities once regarded as too
risky have more value than previously seen. 244
Further, to the extent that evidence bears out that management is
already risk averse, some cognitive bias towards underestimation of risk
may balance out risk aversion. 245 It is not clear to what extent
insensitivity to risk impacts corporate profitability, shareholder wealth,
or other measures of corporate financial success. However, a more
balanced approach to risk-taking may result in greater profitability, and
likely would result in better considered decisions. 246
4. Other Gatekeepers are Better Monitors
This argument suggests that other gatekeepers are better monitors
of corporate behavior than directors themselves. It may be true that the
best monitors are individuals who have no connection with the
corporation, and can evaluate corporate and director performance
without bias due to financial and other ties described above. But outside
monitors would not address the issue that CIP risk assessment operates
on a day-to-day level as well as at the oversight and strategy levels.
Further, these outside monitors would bring their own biases to the
boardroom.

243. Paredes, supra note 24, at 682.
244. See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 339-40 (2007) (citing to numerous
studies drawing a connection between gender and racial diversity on corporate boards and corporate
profitability).
245. Paredes, supra note 24, at 682.
246. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN.
REV. 33, 51 (2003) (presence of women or minorities on boards has direct positive effect on firm
value).
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V. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The research on cultural norms and risk perception, increased
attention to directors’ monitoring role, and questions raised about the
impact of independence requirements all heighten the need for studies of
director behavior. This Article suggests directions for this and other
research, including empirical research on board interaction in the course
of decision-making and oversight and studies of gender and racial
diversity on boards.
A.

How Do Board Members Perceive their Roles and Functions?

This Article draws from the Kahan study’s conclusions on how
members of the general public perceive abortion, gun, and
environmental risks, and applies those conclusions to corporate
executive assessment of business risk. In essence, this is an armchair
exercise. Its value lies in applying insights from empirical scholarship to
test certain assumptions about boardroom behavior.
However, the boardroom is a “black box” and little scholarship
investigates the connection between behavioral assumptions in corporate
governance law, how board members perceive their roles and functions,
and the actual content of board communication derived from
observation. 247 Empirical research should be conducted to capture how
members of boards of directors, corporate officers, and executives
actually perceive and deliberate various business risks. 248 This research
could relate how courts expect directors to behave to actual director
behavior, and ultimately may be useful in formulating rules related to
independent boards.
In addition, the research could relate behavior to worldviews. One
hypothesis is that public company boards in the United States, which
tend to be dominated by white males, also tend to value hierarchical and
individualistic norms over other worldviews. This statistical finding
would be consistent with the fact that board members are part of a
paradigmatic hierarchy.
Further, “[p]ersons who have a high
hierarchical orientation expect resources, opportunities, respect and the
like to be ‘distributed on the basis of explicit public social
classifications, such as sex, color, . . . holding a bureaucratic office, [or]
247. See, e.g., Dalvir Samra-Hendriks, Doing ‘Boards-in-Action’ Research, An Ethnographic
Approach for the Capture and Analysis of Directors’ and Senior Managers’ Interactive Routines, 8
CORP. GOV. 244, 244-46 (2000).
248. Posting
of
Gordon
Smith
to
Conglomerate
Blog,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/07/gordon-gee.html (July 11, 2007).
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descent in a senior clan or lineage.’” 249 Such expectations would be
consistent with corporate norms that reward ascension through the ranks.
Another hypothesis might seek to relate patterns and content of
communication on a particular board to norms held.
Further, a research project might compare content of board
communications for non-profit versus for-profit boards. In addition,
research might compare the content of board communications in a
number of different countries, and relate the content of communication
to corporate governance law.
B.

How Do Boards Really Perceive Decision-making Risk?

Building from the behavior studies described above, in-depth
research could be conducted to answer a number of questions about how
boards weigh risks when making decisions. Do boards strive to act on
the basis of empirical evidence? Do boards discount statements from
senior executives that risks are low—do boards consider that senior
executives may be understating the risks? Do boards make riskier
decisions than would otherwise be in the best interests of shareholders?
What is the appropriate level of risk?
The decision-making process appears to be routinized, even when a
decision should be given more scrutiny. More transparency is needed
regarding how corporate boards function in their decision-making and
oversight capacities. 250
C.

Gender and Racial Diversity on Corporate Boards

Would more diversity lead to “better” decision-making? This
Article argues that cognitive bias stemming from cultural norms leads
public company boards to underestimate risks. However, cognitive bias
affects everyone to some degree. To the extent that there is significant
diversity on the board of a publicly traded corporation, in terms of
worldviews as well as race and gender, the board may make decisions
that are more legitimate because the board fully considered—and
questioned—various perspectives. 251 While the Yale study demonstrates

249. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 4.
250. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 10809 (2003) (study using twenty-four different corporate governance elements concludes that
companies with superior corporate governance measures have higher market valuations).
251. Carter, supra note 246, at 36 (diverse board could help “evaluate more alternatives and
more carefully explore the consequences of these alternatives”). See also Daniel P. Forbes &
Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as
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that diversity may have that effect, insights derived from critical race
and feminist theory show that diversity alone is not enough. Board
members holding diverse views must view each other with legitimacy.
What barriers to legitimacy and effective communication among
board members exist, and would those barriers negate the positive
impact of greater diversity in terms of worldviews, race, and gender?
Studies of director behavior, as well as critical race and feminist theory,
may shed light on these questions. The results of the studies could
impact legal scholarship concerning race and gender diversity on
corporate boards.
D.

Director Education

Post-SOA, there has been a push to ensure that adequate
information flows to the board and to educate directors on their
responsibilities under the new rules. Director education programs may
be an ideal vehicle to disseminate factual information about contested
matters such as the value of independent directors and the value of
derivative litigation. But, would dissemination of empirical information
during director training matter? Would better internal information
systems improve information flow to the board and neutralize the bias?
Empirical evidence of under-evaluation of risks might include evidence
that share prices fell due to a particular decision (harming shareholders);
that assets were depleted and the corporation forced into bankruptcy
(harming shareholders and creditors); that facilities were forced to close
and that jobs were lost (harming employees and communities). The
same bias that results in the under-emphasis of risks also means that
empirical evidence that does not support cultural status will be rejected.
Therefore, dissemination of empirical information about risks, if it can
be found, may not change board decision-making.
Others have proposed educating directors on their cognitive
tendencies and training directors to overcome those tendencies. 252

Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 489, 494-99 (1999) (boards benefit from
conflict derived from thorough consideration of alternatives).
252. See Paredes, supra note 24, at 740-41 (expressing the view that the psychology of
decision-making should be a corporate governance concern, and that in order to “make risks more
salient” directors should be trained to consider the opposite—seek dissenting views, search for
disconfirming evidence, and interrogate assumptions more rigorously). Stanford University has a
well-known Directors’ College and the Roberts Program in Law, Business and Corporate
Governance at Stanford University. See Stanford Law School, Directors’ College (2008),
http://www.seeuthere.com/rsvp/invitation/invitation.asp?id=/m2c523-652769787287. The recent
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Dissemination of information about cognitive bias and its effect on risk
perception—metacognition—may be ineffective to change behavior.
Mere awareness of bias created by cultural norms need not lead to
changed norms or values.
Scholars of behavioral economics have proposed identity affirming
as a way to overcome cultural bias. Identity affirming may be a more
effective way to achieve change in board behavior. In any event,
research on director behavior and on CIP risk assessment would inform
the content of education programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although courts and commentators make assumptions about
director behavior, little is known publicly about how corporate boards
actually function and the content of board communication. 253 Those of
us who are not public company directors, who have not sat on corporate
boards, and who have not conducted a case study of corporate boards
probably know little about how directors themselves perceive their roles
and functions. While few, if any, would argue that there is less
transparency today than there was in, say, 1934 when Justice Brandeis
opined that “the best disinfectant is sunlight” 254 and when the Securities
Exchange Act became law, many probably would agree that corporate
directors could provide needed insight into not only their degree of
independence and disinterest, as defined in federal and state law, but
also about how they perceive their roles and functions as members of the
board and of board committees.
This Article applies the findings generated by the Yale study on
identity-protective cognition to corporate director behavior, and analyzes
corporate governance policy and legal doctrine to further align executive
decision-making with behavioral norms that would increase value for all
corporate constituencies. More research on director behavior is needed
Directors College (held in June, 2007) did not include explicit mention of metacognition training
(e.g., training in cognitive tendencies at play in decision-making) in the introductory materials.
253. Quite a bit has been written about what directors, and “independent” directors should do.
Much of the literature begins with the Berle and Means study, see BEARLE & MEANS, supra note
28, and continues through the 90s with the shareholder primacy versus director primacy debate. In
this scholarship, there is much speculation and quite reasonable conclusion-drawing about what
directors actually do. But there is little empirical research on how directors actually perceive their
roles and functions vis-à-vis board committees, other directors, shareholders and other
constituencies.
254. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, HARPER’S WKLY.
(1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
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to determine the extent of cognitive bias on board decision-making, and
on the interactions among board members.
This Article has proposed a number of reasons why courts should
give greater recognition to the effects of cognitive bias on director
behavior on corporate boards. While it may still be too early for
wholesale corporate governance changes, it is not too early to examine
more closely CIP risk perception and other cognitive biases as an
explanation for the type of misperception of risks underlying director
behavior in Enron, Worldcom, Hewlett-Packard, and most recently,
Whole Foods. 255
Nonetheless, given the tentativeness of the evidence with respect to
corporate directors as opposed to members of the general public, it is
unlikely that a court would fully credit a derivative plaintiff’s cognitive
bias argument, supported by the empirical evidence on cultural
cognition’s effect on risk perception. 256 However, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that cultural norms do effect directors’ risk perceptions. In
addition to further study of this issue, the Article proposes a number of
steps that courts and corporations could take to deal with cognitive bias,
including enhanced review of directors’ decisions, and director
education as a method to counteract cognitive bias on corporate boards.

255. Enron and Worldcom have come to epitomize financial and accounting fraud and the lack
of director perception of that fraud, in part due to directors’ inattention. Hewlett-Packard has
become the “poster child” to illustrate pretexting—an investigative practice involving gathering
confidential information through the use of invented stories. See Yuki Noguchi & Ellen
Nakashima, House Panel Digs Deep in HP Spy Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at D01.
Hewlett-Packard’s former board chair, Patricia Dunn, former general counsel, Ann Baskins, and
former chief ethics officer, Kevin Hunsacker, resigned after it was revealed that they had used
pretexting to determine the source of a board leak of confidential information regarding HewlettPackard’s long-term strategic plans. Id. (The source was Hewlett-Pakard board member George
Keyworth.) Whole Foods and the SEC are investigating Whole Foods’ Chief Executive Officer,
John Mackey’s anonymous internet postings attacking rival Wild Oats’ management as “clearly
doesn’t known what it is doing” and the company “has no value and no future.” See Whole Foods
CEO’s Anonymous Online Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 12, 2007, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19718742/. Whole Foods later attempted to purchase Wild Oats. Id.
In time, HP and Whole Foods behavior may come to be seen as hubris, underestimation of risk,
overconfidence, or another type of cognitive bias.
256. A study also could determine if business law decisions reflect a cognitive bias on the part
of the judiciary.
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